Social Demobilization and the Absence of a European Culture of Defense
At the Threshold of a War Scenario
Europe today finds itself at that moment in history when choices are still possible, but pretense is no longer an option. We are not at war, yet we are no longer at peace. We do not yet hear the cannons, but we feel the tremor beneath our feet.
Threats do not announce themselves with solemn declarations or appear in visible uniforms. They arrive as interruptions, as doubts, as fatigue, as internal divisions. They arrive disguised as eroded normality. And when they finally reveal themselves, they have already advanced too far.
Europe looks at its armies and reassures itself. Europe enumerates its alliances and convinces itself. Europe examines its budgets and trusts itself.
But reality—this relentless judge—does not today ask how many tanks, ships, submarines, fighter jets, drones, or missiles are in the inventory. It asks how many citizens were willing to bear the weight of the test.
Because in the prelude to every great crisis, armies do not fail first: societies fail first, those that no longer believe that defense is a common task. And it is in that invisible terrain that Europe today finds itself dangerously exposed.
I. THE REAL PROBLEM: IT IS NOT MILITARY, IT IS SOCIAL
Europe possesses armies, technological capabilities, and formal alliances. What it does not possess homogeneously—and what is far more decisive—is societies prepared to resist. It lacks something harder to manufacture, slower to build, and more costly to recover once lost: societies willing to endure and resist.
Wars of the 21st century—as in the 20th century—are decided in factories that continue producing under pressure, in hospitals that do not collapse when supplies fail, in cities that do not surrender when the lights go out, and, above all, in the collective will of a people who decide not to break.
The war in Ukraine has reminded us of an old lesson that Europe believed it had outgrown in the comfort of peace: resistance is a social phenomenon before it is a military one. If society fragments, if fear overrides duty, if fatigue triumphs over cohesion, then defeat arrives without the need to occupy any territory.
Russia has not relied solely on the force of arms. It has relied—with cold, persistent calculation—on the erosion of morale, informational confusion, disruption of daily life, and the psychological wear on populations.
The Kremlin has understood that in the EU the weakest link is not the steel of armored vehicles, but civil conviction. And here emerges the paradox that should worry any responsible European leader: the European Union can fight, but not all of its societies are prepared to resist.
The EU can mobilize battalions, but not necessarily communities. It can issue statements, but not always sustain sacrifices. It can react to crises, but not always anticipate or endure them over time.
Societies unprepared for scarcity crumble in the face of disruption. Societies uneducated in risk freeze in the face of threat. Societies that have fully delegated their defense end up losing even the awareness of what is worth defending. This is not about militarizing Europe. It is about not morally disarming its citizens.
Because when pressure arrives—and it will, whether in the form of cyberattacks, energy sabotage, mass disinformation, or open conflict—having professional armies and powerful alliances will not suffice. It will be entire societies, without uniforms, that determine whether Europe resists… or merely waits to be managed in its defeat.
And this is the uncomfortable truth Europe must face: without mobilized societies, military strength is merely power without depth; and without social depth, no power withstands the test of time.
II. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SOCIAL DEMOBILIZATION
Prolonged peace and the illusion of permanent security
Europe has not demobilized suddenly. It has been lulled into complacency. And, as always happens in great declines, the process has been so slow that many mistook it for progress. Eight decades without total war in Western Europe have not strengthened security awareness; they have diluted it. Security ceased to be perceived as a fragile construction and became a natural, almost biological, state of the continent. Risk was expelled from the collective mental horizon and shifted to a comfortable periphery, where others would handle it.
Defense as a service, not a civic duty
During this long period of peace, threat became abstract, exceptional, and delegable. Defense, which for generations was understood as a shared responsibility among citizens, came to be seen as an outsourced service, administered by alliances and managed by professionals. The citizen stopped feeling involved and began to feel protected. But history does not recognize outsourcing of sacrifice: when the test comes, it demands commitment, not delegation.
Professional armies, spectator societies
Europe built modern, technological, and efficient armed forces, but did not build a corresponding civil defense in parallel. The abolition of compulsory military service was not replaced with civic service or basic self-protection training. Citizens stopped participating in security and became observers instead. And when a society observes its defense instead of practicing it, it begins to lose even the understanding of what is at stake.
Welfare without the pedagogy of sacrifice
The European welfare state and the EU’s Economic, Social, and Territorial Cohesion constitute the greatest political achievements of the 20th century on a global scale, yet they were built on growing rights without a clear doctrine of collective sacrifice. In the absence of this pedagogy, every disruption is experienced as failure, every cost as injustice, and every effort as an illegitimate imposition. Resilience requires accepting discomfort and renunciation; permanent welfare obscures it until it is too late.
The erosion of “us” and the fragility of common bonds
European societies today are more diverse and complex, but also more fragile in what makes resistance possible: a recognizable “we.” Shared identity has weakened, replaced by partial narratives that coexist without articulating a common destiny. Without a collective narrative, there is no shared risk, and without shared risk, there is no mobilization.
When memory becomes an obstacle
The 20th century left deep scars and a legitimate distrust of militarism. But that caution has become a reflex that confuses democratic defense with authoritarianism. Any preparation was stigmatized as warmongering. Thus, Europe, fearful of repeating its past, has ended up morally disarmed against the challenges of the future.
Hybrid war as an attack on will
Europe’s adversaries have understood this fragility better than many Europeans. Hybrid war does not first seek military defeat but social paralysis. It ridicules preparedness, fosters cynicism, and sows doubt. A society that loses confidence in its ability to resist has already been partially defeated without the need to occupy its territory.
Political silence in the face of uncomfortable truth
Speaking of defense has electoral costs, and telling the truth requires courage. Too many leaders have opted for reassuring ambiguity and technocratic language. But no society has ever been mobilized through euphemisms. A people cannot be prepared by concealing the nature of the risks they face.
III. SPECIFIC FACTORS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
A Union built to prosper, not to survive
The EU was constructed as a project of prosperity, not as a community of survival. It is perceived—and presents itself—as a market, a regulator, a distributor of funds, a guarantor of norms. Rarely as a collective shield. And a political community that does not conceive of itself as protective cannot demand sacrifices when protection requires effort.
European citizens know what the EU is when they receive funds, comply with regulations, or travel across borders. But they do not know—because they have not been told—what the EU is when security breaks down. Without this perception of protection, European defense lacks emotional legitimacy. And without emotional legitimacy, there is no willingness to sacrifice.
A fractured geography of risk
Europe does not face a common threat: it faces threats unevenly distributed. For Finland, war is not an academic hypothesis but a recurring historical possibility. For the Baltic States, it is a recent memory. For other countries, it is a distant, almost abstract echo.
This inequality in risk perception fractures European strategic awareness. Where the threat is immediate, society prepares. Where it seems remote, it is relativized, minimized, or delegated. The result is a Union that reacts asymmetrically to a challenge that, by definition, is shared.
Without a commonly perceived threat, there can be no shared culture of defense. And without that culture, strategic solidarity becomes fragile precisely when it is most needed. The EU thus reveals itself as a collection of overlapping national securities, not as a community of destiny capable of resisting together.
Language that fails to summon
Even when Europe speaks of defense, it does so in a language that does not mobilize. “Resilience,” “capacity,” “mechanisms,” “instruments.” Correct, precise words, but devoid of soul. Bureaucratic language, not a call to action.
Societies are not mobilized by regulations or acronyms. They mobilize when they understand the meaning of what is asked of them. When they know why they must resist, for whom, and for what. Trapped in its own technocracy, the EU has forgotten that defense is also a moral and civic act, not merely an administrative one.
The absence of a European civic epic is not an aesthetic flaw; it is a strategic vulnerability. Without narrative, there is no cohesion. Without cohesion, there is no resistance. And without resistance, any military architecture becomes a structure without foundations.
Europe as a sum of interests, not yet as a community of sacrifice
At its core, Europe’s problem is not the lack of resources or capabilities, but the absence of a narrative that transforms shared interests into shared responsibility. The EU functions reasonably well when distributing benefits. It falters when it must distribute costs. And defense is inevitably the realm where costs precede benefits.
If Europe does not see itself as a community willing to bear together the consequences of its own defense, it will remain vulnerable in what matters most: the collective will to resist.
IV. SOCIETIES THAT ARE PREPARED TO WIN
Where defense is civic culture, not exception
In Europe, there are societies that have understood an uncomfortable but essential truth: war is not chosen; it is confronted. These societies are not more bellicose, but more realistic. They are not obsessed with conflict, but they cannot afford to ignore it. In these societies, defense is neither taboo nor a shameful word, but a civic responsibility integrated into national life.
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and, to a lesser but growing extent, Poland represent this model. Their strength lies not only in their armed forces, but in the conscious preparedness of their populations. They have internalized that security is not an external service, but a social contract.
Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Denmark are at an advanced stage of social and cultural preparedness. Finland and Sweden have integrated defense into everyday life. Historical memory of past conflicts, geographical proximity to Russia, and constant perception of risk have made defense a widely accepted collective responsibility.
Nordic society understands that resisting is a duty and has built civil defense structures, organized reserves, and citizen training that allow immediate mobilization. Education in resilience, integration of civil society with the armed forces, and exhaustive planning for hybrid and conventional scenarios ensure that these nations can fight and endure with high efficiency.
These societies maintain structured civil reserves, state continuity plans, basic self-protection training, a culture of psychological resilience, and a clear narrative: if we are attacked, we all resist. They do not wait for the military to solve everything; they know the military needs a society that supports it.
Memory as a defensive weapon
Unlike other regions of Europe, these societies have not turned historical memory into anesthesia, but into warning. They know the price of occupation, surrender, and misunderstood neutrality. They do not confuse preparation with provocation, nor defense with authoritarianism.
In these societies, foreign disinformation meets clear limits. Cynicism does not easily take root because there is a strong, cohesive national identity oriented toward democratic survival. The message is simple and devastating to any aggressor: we will not freeze, we will not collapse, we will not fragment.
Mobilization before the first shot
These societies understand that modern war begins before the first missile. Therefore, they act in the informational, economic, logistical, and psychological spheres from the first sign of pressure. They close ranks, communicate clearly, reduce critical vulnerabilities, and accept temporary sacrifices as part of collective defense.
Their greatest strength is not weaponry, but the shared certainty that resistance is possible and necessary. That conviction, when collective, deters more than any weapons system.
V. HOW THEY WILL RESIST AND WIN IF ATTACKED
Total defense: society as a conscious battlefield
If these societies were attacked, they would not wait for confusing instructions or empty reassuring messages. They would activate total defense: the state, the economy, communication networks, civil society, and the armed forces would act as a single body.
The population would know what to do, what to avoid, how to protect critical infrastructure, how to cooperate with authorities, and how to withstand psychological pressure. Hybrid warfare would lose its effectiveness because it would encounter not panic or disorientation, but civic discipline.
Resistance is not self-immolation; it is persistence
These societies do not confuse resistance with pointless sacrifice. Their goal is not to die for the homeland, but to live free within it. To resist means to buy time, preserve cohesion, prevent institutional collapse, and make the cost of aggression unbearable for the attacker.
Each day of organized resistance weakens the aggressor politically, economically, and morally. Every failed attempt at disinformation reinforces internal confidence. Every shared sacrifice consolidates the legitimacy of the democratic state.
Victory as attrition of the aggressor
In the 21st century, victory does not always mean advancing, but not yielding. These societies would win not because they annihilate the enemy, but because they force it to confront a reality it hates: a population that does not surrender, does not collaborate, and does not fragment.
The aggressor would find a territory hostile not only militarily, but socially. No collaborators, no effective fifth column, no passive population. Only citizens aware that their role is decisive.
The contrast with demobilized Europe
Here lies the hardest lesson for the rest of the European Union. The difference between these societies and the others is not cultural or genetic, but political and pedagogical. They have been educated to resist. They have been told the truth. They have been treated as adults responsible for their own destiny.
Where this awareness exists, freedom has defenders. Where it does not, freedom depends on others. And no democracy should accept living on borrowed resilience.
VI. SOCIETIES PRONE TO SURRENDER
When security is outsourced and will dissolves
Europe contains societies that have forgotten an immutable truth: freedom is not inherited; it is defended. It is not that they lack armies or resources; it is that they lack a structured social will to resist. In these societies, surrender does not appear as a dramatic act, but as a silent, everyday habit. Defense is delegated to others, responsibility is outsourced, and prudence is confused with inaction.
The danger is twofold: the aggressor does not need to invade to subdue; it is enough to find a population that hesitates, waits for instructions, and depends on others to resist. Surrender, thus, precedes war.
Germany: economic power, divided consciousness
Germany is at an intermediate stage: a wealthy, organized, technologically advanced society, but with fragmented defense awareness. After World War II, pacifism became a deep, almost identity-forming moral principle, which still conditions political and social culture. The Bundeswehr is professional, efficient, and well-equipped, but society perceives defense as the responsibility of the state and NATO, not as a collective duty.
France: vigorous social will, fragmented and comfortable
France combines a history of great armies and military glories with a society that has experienced decades of relative peace. Material strength coexists with a social will that, although potentially vigorous, is fragmented and conditioned by the comfort of the state. French society today lives in a context where defense is perceived partly as the responsibility of the central government and international alliances.
Spain: reliance on external security
Spain represents a paradigmatic case of this dynamic. After decades of prolonged peace, with the memory of civil war and dictatorships transformed into comfortable historical lessons, society has learned to trust external protection: NATO, the European Union, international agreements. Defense is perceived more as a service than as a duty. Threat perception is low, and awareness of collective sacrifice is tenuous.
The result: in the face of a hybrid or conventional attack, social response could be fragmented, slow, and dependent on the action of other actors. This is not an absence of individual courage, but a lack of organized collective preparation.
Italy: comfort and internal fragmentation
Italy, with its history of fluctuating alliances and internal regional tensions, shows a similar pattern. Society has internalized the idea that security is the responsibility of the central state structure and external allies. Political and regional diversity, together with a narrative of prioritized social welfare, reduces the willingness to take common risks. In the event of an attack, the response could be hampered by institutional disorganization and insufficient civil resistance.
Belgium and other small states: strategic dependence as weakness
Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and other small nations face a double challenge: on the one hand, their geopolitical position makes them dependent on larger powers; on the other, their citizens are accustomed to delegating security to EU and NATO protection. Excessive reliance on third parties produces societies prone to surrender in a crisis: without real threat perception or habitual preparation, resilience becomes an abstraction.
Central and Eastern Europe: varied levels of social and cultural defense preparedness
The heart of Central and Eastern Europe houses nations that, although strategically essential, display varied levels of social and cultural preparedness for defense. Hungary and the Czech Republic have structured civic will, though still limited. Slovakia maintains growing risk awareness, though social cohesion has yet to reach prolonged resilience levels.
Croatia retains the memory of the 1990s war, which can trigger rapid mobilization against conventional attacks, but its preparedness for hybrid threats remains incipient. Romania and Bulgaria, at the EU’s southeastern border, combine geopolitical awareness and historical memory with partially developed civil defense systems: they know the threat is real, but sustained resilience depends on strengthening social mobilization and internal cohesion.
Overall, these societies require civic education, a narrative of collective responsibility, and citizen preparation that transforms threat perception into effective and sustained action. The strategic lesson is clear: without organized social will, the defense of Eastern Europe would be fragile under prolonged hybrid or conventional pressures.
Common factors of surrender-prone societies
These societies share characteristics that explain their vulnerability:
- Outsourcing defense: security is seen as someone else’s responsibility, not a personal obligation.
- Social fragmentation and polarization: lack of a collective narrative weakens the cohesion necessary to resist.
- Anesthetized historical memory: past traumas become excuses to avoid preparation, confusing prudence with inaction.
- Culture of welfare without sacrifice: any prolonged effort is seen as imposition, and resilience is reduced to passive expectations.
- Influence of fear merchants: false pacifists, ideological or economic opportunists, and infiltrated external actors generate cynicism, doubt, and resignation.
Awakening against surrender
The first step to reversing this vulnerability is acknowledging the truth: defense is neither a luxury nor a delegated service; it is a shared civic duty. Society must understand real risks, train in self-protection, participate in civil continuity mechanisms, develop cohesion against disinformation, and understand that resisting is not optional heroism, but a condition for democratic survival.
Only in this way can Spain and other surrender-prone societies transform doubt into determination, passivity into action, and dependence into strategic autonomy. Europe’s freedom does not depend on the goodwill of allies: it depends on the will of its citizens to resist together.
VII. HOW TO CREATE A SOCIAL DEFENSE CULTURE IN THE EU
Defending is not just militarizing: it is preventing social collapse
Europe must start with a simple but difficult truth: to defend does not mean to militarize society, but to prevent it from disintegrating under pressure. For too long, the culture of defense has been presented as a threat to democracy, when in reality it is a condition for its survival. It is not about accustoming citizens to war, but preparing them so that war—hybrid or open—does not destroy the fabric that makes democratic life possible. A society that does not collapse is a society that deters. And a deterring society reduces the very probability of conflict.
From protected citizen to responsible citizen
A culture of defense begins when citizens stop seeing themselves solely as passive beneficiaries of security and instead recognize themselves as responsible agents. It is not about demanding permanent heroism, but about reconstructing the notion of shared responsibility. Security can no longer be perceived as a service guaranteed by others, but as a collective task requiring preparation, engagement, and risk awareness. As long as the European citizen does not feel that defense also concerns them, any strategic architecture remains incomplete.
Civic service and belonging to a community of destiny
Europe needs mechanisms that return to citizens a concrete experience of belonging and responsibility. Not necessarily in the form of military conscription, but through civic defense services adapted to democratic and plural societies. Civil protection, emergency logistics, basic cybersecurity, crisis healthcare, continuity of critical infrastructure—these are the trenches of the 21st century.
A society that never trains together does not resist together. Shared service creates bonds, civic discipline, and awareness of a common destiny. Without these bonds, resistance is only a word.
Total defense as a democratic architecture
The countries that resist best are not the most aggressive, but the best prepared. Finland and Sweden have demonstrated that total defense is not an authoritarian doctrine, but a democratic architecture integrating the state, businesses, local authorities, and citizens in a unified preparation effort. Everything works because everything is planned.
Europe must understand that 21st-century defense is not limited to the battlefield. It includes hospitals, electrical grids, transport systems, supply chains, public communications, and social cohesion. Where everything is connected, everything is defendable—or vulnerable.
Educating for security without glorifying war
The culture of defense does not begin in barracks, but in classrooms. Democratic security education does not teach hatred or combat, but how to understand risk, detect manipulation, and act calmly under pressure. Critical thinking, psychological resilience, basic self-protection, and literacy against disinformation are today as essential as classical civic education once was.
A citizen who understands the mechanisms of threat is less manipulable and more resilient. Defense begins in the mind before it begins on the ground.
Recovering the lost language of collective protection
Europe has lost the language to explain defense without provoking rejection. It has allowed essential words to be captured by suspicion or caricature. Discourse must be reclaimed: speak of collective protection, social continuity, democratic resilience, shared security.
Societies are not mobilized by regulations or technicalities. They mobilize when they understand what is at stake and why it deserves to be defended. Language is not an ornament: it is a strategic tool.
A European narrative of resistance, not war
Europe does not need a bellicose epic. It needs a narrative of resistance. Not of the defeated enemy, but of the society that does not break. Hospitals functioning under pressure, cities maintaining order without repression, citizens cooperating rather than confronting, institutions that do not freeze in fear. This narrative does not glorify violence: it glorifies the continuity of democratic life in the face of aggression.
Integrating civil society into real defense
Universities, trade unions, professional associations, strategic businesses, civil organizations: all are part of defense, even if rarely recognized as such. Modern defense cannot be limited to closed hierarchical structures; it must integrate broad, capable, and coordinated social networks. When civil society feels part of the effort, defense ceases to be external and becomes internalized.
Telling the truth as an act of leadership
None of this is possible without political leadership willing to tell the truth. Not alarmist truth, but adult truth. Explain the risks, acknowledge vulnerabilities, and clearly define what is expected from the state and from citizens. Transparency does not weaken; it strengthens. Concealment does not protect; it demobilizes. Democracies are defended not by deceiving their peoples, but by trusting their capacity to understand and respond.
Preparing without fear, resisting without hatred
Visible preparation—drills, manuals, clear plans—does not generate panic when communicated calmly. On the contrary, it generates trust. A prepared society does not obsess over war; it lives peacefully knowing it can face it without collapsing. To resist does not require hatred. It requires organization, cohesion, and will. And these virtues are not born in urgency: they are built over time, with clarity and political courage.
Europe at its hour of responsibility
Europe is still on time. Not to avoid all conflict, but to prevent the moral defeat that always precedes strategic defeat. Building a social culture of defense is not a bellicose turn, but an act of historical maturity.
Because in the 21st century, as in the darkest moments of the 20th, it will not be the richest or most armed societies that survive, but those that know how to resist without losing what makes them worthy of defense. Preparing is not alarming.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Europe: beyond resources, the will
Europe does not lack resources. Its armies are competent, its arsenals modern, its alliances solid. It can deploy technological and strategic capacities that a century ago would have seemed miraculous. But all of this, powerful as it is, is useless if it is not supported by what truly determines history: structured social will.
Wars are not won, nor peace sustained, solely with tanks, missiles, or budgets. They are won when society understands, accepts, and assumes its role in defense. They are won when every citizen recognizes that their freedom is not a gift, but a shared responsibility.
The culture of defense: an act of education and legitimacy
A culture of defense cannot be imposed through decrees or technical speeches. It cannot be bought with promises of security paid for by others. It is taught, explained, and legitimized. It is a slow, patient, and steady process that builds the common and moral sense of collective survival.
It is about teaching that resisting is not an optional heroic act, but a democratic obligation. That preparing is not militarism, but civil rationality. That protecting society is not the privilege of a few, but the duty of all.
The internal enemy and the merchants of fear
But Europe also faces threats more insidious than missiles and drones. It faces those who disguise weakness as virtue: false pacifists declaring peace while eroding preparation, opportunists selling fear for personal material or ideological gain, Kremlin agents working from within to divide and paralyze, disguising submission as prudence.
Each contributes to the same outcome: societies that do not resist. That doubt themselves. That delegate their future to those without loyalty. Europe cannot afford to yield to them, because inaction is their most effective ally and doubt is their most dangerous weapon.
Resisting: a prerequisite to winning
To resist means sustaining cohesion under pressure, maintaining morale in the face of fear, preserving freedom against manipulation and cynicism. To resist means that when adversaries test our will, they find firmness, not weakness; determination, not doubt; community, not resignation.
Europe has no right to rest on the comfort of prolonged peace. Europe must awaken. It must teach, organize, unite, mobilize, and demand that every citizen participate in the security of all. Because only collective will can transform military strength into true, lasting victory.
The continent’s history will not be written by those observing from the security of indifference, but by those who understand that freedom is not inherited: it is defended. And in that defense, in that mobilization, Europe will discover its true power: the capacity to resist, and with it, the certainty of victory.
IX. SOURCES
CESEDEN – NATO Beyond Resilience: Civil and Military Integration in Europe. Spanish Center for National Defense Studies.
European Commission – EU Preparedness Union Strategy. Official documents on civil preparedness and resilience in the EU.
Council of the European Union – Council vows better civil protection preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats, 2023.
Council of the European Union – EU NATO 10th Progress Report, 2025. Report on EU-NATO cooperation and strategic resilience.
Critical Infrastructure Resilience and Civil Preparedness – Crisis Management Days 2025.
HCSS / CSDS – Assessing Europe’s Resilience and Preparedness in an Era of Strategic Risks, 2025.
European Parliament – Preparedness as a Strategic Policy Concept, 2025.
Sauli Niinistö – Niinistö Report on Resilience and Civil Protection, European Civil Protection Knowledge Network, 2025.
